# COMPUTER SECURITY

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# **Cryptography: more advanced topics**

## Randomness

- essential in Cryptography!
  - one time pad, IV (initialization values), stream cipher seeds, hashes, *nonces*, key generation...
- generation
  - excellent: physical source
    - inherent: radioactive decay, brownian movement, ...
    - depending on initial conditions: (non-biased) roulette or dice, ...
  - $\circ$   $\;$  reasonable: algorithmic-based with physical seed
    - cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators
      - use physical (  $\cong$  random) sources (e.g. mouse movements)<sup>1</sup>
  - bad: algorithmic-based
    - pseudorandom number generators (e.g. POSIX's random())
- 1 Linux's getrandom() (/dev/random, /dev/urandom)

...Randomness...

#### **Evaluation**

- <u>frequency analysis</u>
  - determine the frequency distribution of digits or bit patterns of a sequence of values:
    - if (truly) random, each digit or bit occurs with approximately equal frequency
- <u>entropy measurement</u><sup>1</sup>
  - measure of the unpredictability of the values in sequence:
    - if values are (truly) random, unpredictability (so, entropy) is maximum

1 Calculation of entropy varies. In computing, if values occur with equal probability,  $E = \log_2$  (no. of possible values) ; if value is one bit, it can be 0 and 1; then E = 1 (bit). In information theory (Shannon!) E (in bits) =  $-\sum_i [(\text{probability of occurrence of value }i)*\log_2 (\text{probability of occurrence of value }i)], where <math>i$  is a value from a possible set. Again, if i is one bit, and its 0 or 1 value occurs with equal probability, E = 1 (bit).

#### ...Randomness: evaluation...

- <u>statistical tests</u>
  - examination of properties such as uniformity, independence and distribution of sequence values. Examples: Chi-square<sup>1</sup>, Kolmogorov-Smirnov<sup>2</sup>, RUNS<sup>3</sup>.
    - if sequence is (truly) random, results depend on specific test performed
- <u>serial correlation measurement</u>
  - $\circ~$  check for correlations between successive values:
    - if (truly) random sequence of values, correlation should be zero
- randomness tests
  - run specialized tests. Examples of test suites: NIST Statistical<sup>4</sup>, Dieharder<sup>5</sup>, ENT<sup>6</sup>.
    - if sequence is (truly) random, results depend on specific test performed
- 1 <u>en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chi-squared\_test</u>
- 2 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov%E2%80%93Smirnov\_test
- 3 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wald%E2%80%93Wolfowitz\_runs\_test
- 4 <u>nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-22r1a.pdf</u>
- 5 webhome.phy.duke.edu/~rgb/General/dieharder.php
- 6 www.fourmilab.ch/random/

...Randomness: evaluation...

#### ENT, A Pseudorandom Number Sequence Test Program

- battery of tests:
  - frequency (ideal: all values with same number of occurrences)
  - entropy (ideal: 8 bits per byte)
  - compression (ideal: 0 % compression)
  - Chi-square (ideal: ] ~10%, ~90% [)
  - arithmetic mean (ideal: 50% of possible values)
  - Monte Carlo value for Pi (ideal: Pi with very "low" error)
  - Serial correlation coefficient (ideal: 0)
- used in a SEED lab!

## **Cryptographic models**

## Definitions

- cryptographic model
  - mostly, formal description of the security properties and assumptions of a cryptographic system
  - should define: adversarial capabilities; security goals<sup>1</sup>; security assumptions (environmental and operational details<sup>2</sup>)...
  - so, includes attack models

1 e.g. confidentiality

2 such as computing resources



...Cryptographic models' definitions...

- attack model<sup>1</sup>
  - specification of the assumptions attributed to cryptanalysts targeting<sup>2</sup> a cryptographic system
  - depend on several perspectives: goals, knowledge, capabilities
- (computational) oracle
  - "black box" that is able to produce a (true) solution for any instance of a given computational problem (i.e. a decision problem)
- random oracle
  - specific oracle that
    - for each input, outputs a unique and (truly) random value, uniformly distributed in the (infinite) co-domain
    - is deterministic: always outputs the same value every time the same input is submitted

1 or: classification of attacks

2 attempting to break

### Attack models: cryptanalyst perspectives

- goals
- knowledge
- capabilities

### Goals of cryptanalyst:

- <u>capture the keys</u>
  - break the system, as cryptographic protection failed!
- <u>capture plaintexts</u>
  - partial break of confidentiality protection
- <u>forge (or replay) plaintexts</u>
  - partial break of integrity protection
- <u>deny services (or communication)</u>
  - break of availability protection

...Attack models...

### Knowledge of cryptanalyst:

- knows almost nothing of system's details (black-box, closed system)
  - $\circ$  in principle, great attack difficulty if system is really robust
- knows some system's details (grey-box system)
  - before attack, additional information gathering is needed (e.g. with social engineering)
- knows all system's details (white-box, open system)
  - in principle, least difficult to attack, unless strength of system relays in its inner robustness

...Attack models...

### Capabilities of cryptanalyst:

- <u>standard</u>
  - limitations are just the amount of time and computational power available (so, not knowledge)
- passive (mostly)
  - o <u>basic</u>
    - has access to ciphertexts only (that is not able to choose)
  - o <u>known plaintext</u>
    - some (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs are available



...Attack models: capabilities...

- <u>active interaction</u>
  - o <u>basic</u>
    - can query and interact with target system
  - o <u>chosen plaintext</u>
    - is able to prepare plaintexts and obtain their ciphertexts<sup>1 2</sup>
  - <u>adaptive chosen plaintext</u> (real time interaction?...)
    - is able to iteratively query the system with a succession of plaintexts, after receiving corresponding ciphertexts
  - o <u>chosen ciphertext</u>
    - is able to prepare ciphertexts and obtain their deciphered counterparts<sup>3</sup>
    - is able to prepare ciphertexts that will decipher to predictable plaintexts
  - adaptive chosen ciphertext
    - is able to iteratively query the system with a succession of ciphertexts, after receiving corresponding plaintexts
- 1 e.g. from an encryption oracle. Trivial with public key cryptography! Why?
- 2 Exercise: show how to use this attack to obtain the key used by a (not so truly) one-time pad.
- 3 e.g. from a "decryption" oracle (makes more sense for digital signatures' attacks, as public key is used for "deciphering" signed docs)



#### ...Attack models: capabilities...

- <u>side-channel</u>
  - can gather information not obviously related to the cryptographic protective operations: electronic noise, sound, elapsed time...
- <u>social engineering</u>
  - is able to trick some humans to give away partial or essential secrets

### Defense models: cryptographer perspective

- defense will depend on knowledge of previous attack perspectives
- can be guided by more or less formal approaches, included in the mentioned cryptographic *models* (not covered here)




## **General enciphering schemes**

#### Definition

• sets of algorithms and protocols used to transform plaintext (clear data) into ciphertext (concealed data) in such a way that unauthorized users cannot reverse the transformation.

#### Types

- <u>deterministic encipherment</u>
  - $\circ$   $\,$  the same ciphertext is always produced for a given plaintext and key
- probabilistic encipherment [FIG]
  - different ciphertexts are, in general, produced for a given plaintext and key<sup>1</sup>
- format-preserving encipherment
  - ciphertext is produced in the same format<sup>2</sup> as the plaintext
- 1 An example is ElGamal's encryption system.
- 2 The meaning of "format" varies: only letters from English alphabet are used; *n*-bit block cipher (only *n*-bit numbers are accepted and produced), etc.



...General enciphering schemes: types...


- <u>perfect secrecy encipherment</u>
  - the ciphertext reveals no information at all about the plaintext
  - $\circ$   $\,$  ideal goal: works even with an all-mighty cryptanalyst  $\,$
- <u>semantic security encipherment</u>
  - the ciphertext possible informations about the plaintext, cannot be feasibly extracted
  - realistic goal: protects even with adaptive chosen plaintext attacks
- <u>indistinguishable encipherment</u>
  - a ciphertext does not reveal information to allow distinguishing which plaintext produced it from a group of chosen plaintexts<sup>1</sup>
- <u>malleable encipherment</u>
  - the ciphertext produced from a given plaintext can be modified in a way that the deciphered new plaintext is predictably related to the first
  - dangerous: does not protect against (adaptive) chosen ciphertext attacks

1 or the distinction is no better then that of random guessing



...General enciphering schemes...

- <u>homomorphic encipherment</u>
  - the ciphertexts are able to suffer computations that, when deciphered, are identical to related computations on the corresponding plaintexts
  - useful with cloud computing, as cloud server will not need to know clients' deciphering keys
  - Ex.: RSA is homomorphic!<sup>1</sup>
- (perfect) forward secrecy encipherment<sup>2</sup>
  - the capture of a session key (and so being able to decipher the session) will not allow the decipherment of previous sessions
  - Also, knowledge of a long-term key does not allow the decipherment of past sessions.)<sup>3</sup>
- 1 In RSA, if n is the modulus and e the encryption exponent:  $C = E(P) = P^e \mod n$ . The homomorphic property is immediate: E(P1) \* E(P2) = E(P1\*P2).
- 2 This has to do more with key exchange schemes than with the encipherment operations by themselves
- 3 However, the breaking of the encipherment *algorithm*, in the sense of being able to operate it without a cryptographic key, might allow the decipherment of past sessions.



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## Cipher modes of operation<sup>1</sup>

### **Base method**

- $P = P_1 P_2 \dots$  parts (blocks) of equal size
  - block size: 1 b, 1 B, 8 B (typical), 16 B (typical)...
- enciphering methods:
  - o stream

• 
$$K = K_1 K_2 \ldots : C = E_{K_1}(P_1) E_{K_2}(P_2) \ldots =^2 K_1(P_1) K_2(P_2) \ldots$$

- o block
  - $K: C = K(P_1) K(P_2) \ldots$
- "mix" of previous

• 
$$K, v_1, v_2 \dots^3 : C = E_K(P_1, v_1) E_K(P_2, v_2) \dots = K_{v_1}(P_1) K_{v_2}(P_2) \dots$$

- 1 Necessary for the symmetric encipherment of "long" texts. But, in practice, almost any text is "long"!...
- 2 for simplicity
- 3 real single key with additional (and different) information per block: overall, looks like a different "virtual" key per block



### Rationale for "operation modes"<sup>1</sup>

- stream
  - **Pro: most secure**<sup>2</sup>
  - Con: long, one-time usable, (random) key
- block
  - $\circ~$  Pro: simplicity and single (random) key
  - Con: same plaintext, same ciphertext

• if 
$$P_1 = P_2$$
, then  $C_1 = C_2$  [FIG]

- mixed
  - Pro: single (random) key
  - Con: added complexity
    - several possibilities
- 1 Goal is *confidentiality* protection; *integrity* protection is not guaranteed: with some modes, even the "mixed", modifications of ciphertext might go undetected; for confidentiality <u>and</u> integrity protection, <u>authenticated encipherment</u> is used.
- 2 even *provable* secure with *One-time pad*



*Fig. a) original picture; b) enciphered with AES 256b, ECB mode* 



#### **Pictures' notation**





Fig. *IV* is Initialization Value (or Vector), public value that, as a rule, should be random.



## Some operation modes

### Stream method

- Some properties:
  - usually,  $E = D = XOR^1 ( \oplus )$
  - $\circ ~$  no padding of last block
  - parallelizable en/deciphering
  - ultimate security: *K*<sup>*i*</sup> random, one-time value
- Formulas:
  - $C_i = E_{ki} (P_i)$ , i > 0
  - usually,  $P_i = E_{ki}$  ( $C_i$ )
- Error propagation:<sup>2</sup>
  - exercise!
- 1 bitwise
- 2 When at least one bit/byte of  $C_i$  is garbled, how that is reflected in following blocks.




*Fig. Use of plain stream method: a) enciphering; b) deciphering* 

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#### **Block method**

- ECB, Electronic Code Book
- Some properties:
  - padding of last block
  - parallelizable en/deciphering
- Formulas:
  - $\circ \quad C_i = E_k (P_i) , i > 0$
  - Write the decipherment formula. :-)
- Error propagation:
  - exercise!



*Fig. Use of (plain) block method: a) enciphering; b) deciphering.* 




#### "Mix" method: CTR

- CTR, Counter Mode
- Some properties:
  - *IV*<sup>1</sup> (random + counter)
  - $\circ$  no padding
  - parallelizable en/deciphering
- Formulas:
  - Write the en/decipherment formulas.
- Error propagation:
  - exercise!



a)

b)



*Fig. Use of "mixed" method CTR: a) enciphering; b) deciphering.* (Notice the virtual keys k<sub>i</sub>.)

### "Mix" method: CFB

- CFB, Cipher FeedBack
- Some properties:
  - *IV* (random)
  - o **no padding**
  - not parallelizable enciphering; parallelizable deciphering
- Formulas:
  - $\circ \quad C_0 = IV;$  $C_i = P_i \oplus E_k (C_{i-1}), i > 0$
  - Write the decipherment formula.
- Error propagation:
  - exercise!





Fig. Use of "mixed" method CFB: a) enciphering; b) deciphering. (Notice the virtual keys k<sub>i</sub>.)

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### "Mix" method: OFB

- OFB, Output FeedBack
- Some properties:
  - *IV* (random) 0
  - no padding Ο
  - not parallelizable 0 en/deciphering, but successive  $E_k^i(IV)$  can be done in advance
- Formulas:
  - $C_i = P_i \oplus E_k^{i}$  (IV),  $i \ge 0$ 0
  - Write the decipherment Ο formula.
- Error propagation:
  - exercise! 0




(Notice the virtual keys  $k_i$ .)

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### "Mix" method: CBC

- CBC, Cipher Block Chaining
- Some properties:
  - *IV* (random) or explicit initialization by (phony) 1st block!
  - o padding
  - not parallelizable enciphering; parallelizable deciphering
- Formulas:
  - $C_0 = IV$ ;  $C_i = E_k (P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$  i > 0
  - Write the decipherment formula.
- Error propagation:
  - exercise!





#### Another view of some operation modes




Fig. The software-view of some of the operation modes (i > 0). In b) and c) the reason for the modes' names is apparent...



## Padding

### Need

- size of plaintext varies (just hardly ever is multiple of block size)
  - so, final block might need<sup>1</sup> padding!
  - but, "casual" padding might open an attack path (*see ahead*)!
- harden message deciphering and traffic analysis<sup>2</sup>
  - $\circ~$  by obscuring the size (and content) of ciphertext
    - e.g. avoiding short messages' attack on RSA<sup>3</sup>
    - e.g. avoiding deterministic ciphering's attack<sup>4</sup>
- 1 Why?... Also, some "modes of operation" do not need padding... why?
- 2 interception and examination of communications (ciphered or not) to deduce information (e.g. from patterns)
- 3 asecuritysite.com/encryption/crackrsa2
- 4 As same plaintext always produces same ciphertext, a cryptanalyst may build a collection of plaintext/ciphertext pairs and look for cipher matches in communication media; it is specially feasible with "public-key cryptography" (why?)!



...Cipher modes of operation: padding...

#### **Padding schemes**

- several schemes (bit padding or, more usually, byte padding)
  - shared-key cryptography
    - e.g. PKCS<sup>1</sup> #5<sup>2</sup>, #7<sup>3</sup> (enciphering) [Fig. ShKey]
  - one-way cryptography
    - e.g. RFC 6234 (SHA-1, SHA-256) [Fig. OneWay a)]
    - e.g. SHA3 (sponge) [Fig. OneWay b)]
  - public-key cryptography
    - e.g. PKCS #1 v2 (RFC 8017)
      - RSA's PKCS1-v1\_5 [Fig. PKCS1]
      - RSA's OAEP, Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding [Fig. OAEP]
        - Exercise (after analyzing picture): what about deciphering?... does receiver need *seed* and *L*?...
- 1 Public Key Cryptography Standards, devised and published by RSA Security LLC since the 1990s
- 2 PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography from a password, generate a (symmetric) key for a following symmetric encipherment.
- 3 *#*7 padding just extends 8B block *#*5 padding to 16B (128b) blocks

...Cipher modes of operation: padding examples (figs)...





Fig. ShKey: Shared-key cryptography padding: examples for PKCS #5 (8B blocks); #7 will be similar, but appropriate to 16B blocks.

Algorithm: add (block\_size - P\_length mod block\_size) bytes; all with value equal to number of added bytes: e.g. if 3 bytes are needed to complete last block, each added byte's value is 3.

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


...Cipher modes of operation: padding examples (figs)...

Fig. OneWay: Instances of one-way cryptography padding:
a) RFC 6234 padding: (SHA1, SHA256...) - sequence of *nn*s is message size;
b) Sponge *multirate* padding: 10\*1 (*r* is the number of bits of input block).

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#### ...Cipher modes of operation: padding examples (figs)...



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...Cipher modes of operation: padding...

### Attack examples

- length extension: one-way cryptography, MAC (if = h(K||P))
  - if hash(P1) = hash(IV, P1) = hash(hash(IV), P1) hash(P1||P2) = hash(P1, P2) = hash(hash(P1), P2)
  - SEED Lab!
- padding oracle: two-way cryptography, CBC mode
  - o if attacker can keep testing decipherment with crafted ciphertext
  - if deciphering error code says explicitly "invalid padding" instead of a general "decryption failed"
  - CBC:  $P_i = D_k(C_i) \oplus C_{i-1} \quad i > 0$ 
    - a byte/bit change in *C*<sub>*i*-1</sub> affects corresponding byte/bit in *P*<sub>*i*</sub>
    - starting from last C<sub>i</sub> block (where padding is), keep changing last byte of previous block until padding is valid; then repeat for previous bytes
    - see [FIG] (PKCS #5, #7 padding)






Fig. Padding oracle attack procedure for PKCS #5, #7 padding (CBC mode). C<sub>3</sub> is last cipher block.

...Cipher modes of operation: padding...

#### Real need for padding?

- avoidance:
  - $\circ$  ciphertext stealing [FIG in Wikipedia]
  - residual block termination [FIG]
- will it be worth the trouble?...







( to be continued...)

