## COMPUTER SECURITY

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# **Cryptography: THE security mechanism <sup>1</sup>**

"Security!" --> "1676c0cf7e901d443bd9cad6c5253fee"

(AES cipher, ECB mode, PKCS#7 padding, 128-b key: "I am JohnDoe 007";
French quotes are just delimiters.)

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1 However, keep in mind: «Cryptography is rarely ever the solution to a security problem.» (D. Gollmann, Computer Security, p. 203)

## **Basics**

## **History**

- Originally:
  - science (and art) of secret writing
  - aimed at hinder the knowledge of sensitive information
- Currently:
  - science (and art?) of providing mechanisms to ensure security properties (confidentiality, integrity...)
  - o aims to control the access to information

#### **Practical uses**

- Traditional:
  - o control access to information by **concealing** it, i.e. making it unintelligible
- Modern:
  - o the traditional, plus
  - control access to information by identifying it with a fingerprint (or hash¹)
  - support all above uses and
    - produce (almost) random numbers
    - derive secret numbers (keys)<sup>2</sup>

## **Relevant types of professionals:**

- *cryptographers* try to master and enhance that access control
- *cryptanalysts* try to break the enabled access control
- PT: síntese, sumário
- 2 pieces of data necessary for using cryptographic security mechanisms

## **Notation**

Symbol	Name of symbol	Meaning of symbol		
P	plaintext <sup>1</sup>	original, uncovered information		
$oldsymbol{E}$	enciphering algorithm	method to conceal the info		
$K_e$	enciphering key	parameter of the concealment methods		
$\boldsymbol{C}$	ciphertext	hidden information		
D	deciphering algorithm	method to recover the original info		
$K_d$	deciphering key	parameter of the recovering methods		
H, h	hash algorithm, hash value	method to transform (hash) the info, transformed info		
$oldsymbol{F}$	fingerprint, hash value	transformed info		

<sup>1</sup> PT: texto inteligível

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#### ...Basics: Notation...

Operation	Symbolic representation		
ciphering	$C = E_{Ke}(P)$ $C = E(P, K_e)$ $C = K_e(P)$		
deciphering	$P = D_{Kd}(C)$ $P = D(C, K_d)$ $P = K_d(C)$		
(cyptographic) hashing <sup>1</sup>	h = H(P) $F = H(P)$ $F = h(P)$		
reversing	$D_{Kd}\left(E_{Ke}\left(P\right)\right)=P$		

If	Cryptography type	
$K_e = K_d$	symmetric	
$K_e \neq K_d$	asymmetric	
$K_e = K^+$ $K_d = K^-$	public-key (asymmetric)	

Advance notice for Digital Signature:  $[Doc]_E <==> K_E^-(Doc) <==> K_E^-(H(Doc))$ 

<sup>1</sup> Note: *cryptographic* hashing is different from *database* hashing.

## Traditional use of Cryptography

- confidentiality protection:
  - o conceal information, by making it unintelligible
  - o *elsewhere* or *later*, retrieve original information




Fig. Original Cryptography: basic model of concealment and recovery of info with examples of attacks (*in* several of Tanenbaum's books).

## Added, newer, usage of Cryptography

- integrity protection:
  - o information is fingerprinted, by calculating its hash (or digest) $^1$
  - elsewhere or later, the hash will be used to detect the adulteration of the original information




Fig. Newer use of Cryptography: basic model for the validation of info (e.g. integrity protection).

Note the need for a protected channel!

1 small array of bytes that represents the original information

## **Breaking cryptographic systems**

- Professionals: cryptanalysts, random crackers
- Methods: mathematics, statistics, intuition<sup>1</sup>
- Goals: depend on type of usage

#### Attacks in traditional use

- Goal: grasp the deciphering key! Sometimes, at least, grasp plaintexts.
- Approaches (in descending order of difficulty):
  - normal
    - only ciphertexts are available
  - known original text ("passively" obtained)
    - both some original texts and their enciphered counterparts are available
  - o <u>planned original text</u> ("actively" prepared)
    - specific original texts are made to be enciphered
- 1 For an example, see Bishop: "Introduction", Chap.8; "Art & Science", chap.9.

### ...Basics: Breaking cryptographic systems...

### Attacks in added recent usage

- Goal: break integrity protection
- Approaches<sup>1</sup> (in descending order of difficulty):
  - find collisions<sup>2</sup>
    - produce document pairs (*birthday attack*³)
    - produce another document for a specific original

<sup>1</sup> the special case of "digital signatures" will be seen elsewhere

<sup>2</sup> meaning: different documents with same fingerprint

<sup>3</sup> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday attack

#### ...Basics

## Ideal cryptographic system's requirements

- hard to break
  - in a reasonable future horizon
  - formal proof would be nice...
- easy to use
  - o otherwise will be rejected or bypassed by users
- if broken, easily replaceable
  - this should be a must, as systems will be broken!
  - depends on what was broken (type of secret)

# **Classification of cryptographic systems**

Perspective	Variant	Sub-variant	Examples	
on the secret	secret algorithm	-	RC4, Crypto1 1	
	secret key(s)	secret key(s) single key, shared-key, symmetric		
		two-key, public key, asymmetric	RSA	
	stream <sup>2</sup>	-	RC4, One-time pad	
on the method	block	(pure)	AES, RSA <sup>3</sup> in ECB ; SHA-2	
		mixed	AES in CBC	
	hidinational variousible to a same	symmetric (for confidentiality <sup>4</sup> )	AES	
on the purpose	bidirectional, reversible, two-way	asymmetric (for authentication <sup>5</sup> )	RSA	
	unidirectional, irreversible, one-way	(for integrity)	SHA-2, SHA-3	
	mixed	(for confidentiality & integrity)	AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA1	

- originally, both were secret; now, they are **not**!
- 2 PT: contínuo, sequencial
- 3 many authors do not ever classify asymmetric systems (e.g. RSA) as "block"... (more on this later)
- 4 usually, with temporary keys
- 5 main usage, with personal and durable (long-lasting) keys

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems

### On the secret

Perspective	Variant	Comments	Exs
on the	secret algorithm	<ul> <li>used in closed applications: military, commercial</li> <li>not recommended by academics<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	RC4 <sup>2</sup> , Crypto1
secret 	secret key(s)	<ul> <li>used everywhere: military, commercial, personal applications</li> <li>recommended by academics<sup>3</sup></li> </ul>	AES <sup>4</sup> , RSA <sup>5</sup>

- 1 because, sooner or later, the secret will be discovered and a replacement is always difficult to produce
- 2 Rivest Cipher 4
- and by common sense as well, if history is something to go by...
- 4 Advanced Encryption Standard
- 5 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the secret

Perspective	Variant	Sub-variant <sup>1</sup>	Comments	Exs
on the secret	shared-key symmetric symm	single key, shared-key, symmetric: $K_e = K_d = K$	<ul> <li>heuristic constructions</li> <li>very efficient computation:</li> <li>very suitable for large amounts of data</li> <li>difficult combination and sharing of key:</li> <li>preferred for closed environments</li> </ul>	
		two-key, public key, asymmetric: $K_e = K^+$ $\neq$ $K_d = K^-$	<ul> <li>math-based constructions</li> <li>very heavy computation:</li> <li>not suitable for large amounts of data</li> <li>easy combination and exchange of keys:</li> <li>ideal for open environments</li> </ul>	RSA

<sup>1</sup> often, the two sub-variants are used in conjunction (more on this later...)

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### ...Classification of cryptographic systems

### On the method

### "Long" texts1

- cryptographic operations<sup>2</sup> have to be done on (equal sized) pieces (blocks)<sup>3</sup>
  - o typical size: 8 B (64 b) and 16 B (128 b)<sup>4</sup>
- enciphering (and deciphering)
  - o modes of operation<sup>5</sup> are ways to use keys in the processing of each piece
- hashing
  - does not use keys (in general)
- final piece might need to be "padded"<sup>6</sup>
  - o as, in general, data size is not a multiple of the piece size
- 1 in practice, almost any text is "long"...
- 2 ciphering, deciphering, hashing
- 3  $P = P_1 P_2 ...$
- 4 but could be 1 b, 1 B, ...
- 5 to be discussed later
- 6 to be discussed later

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method

Perspective	Variant	Sub- variant	Comments	Exs
on the method	stream		<ul> <li>each piece is (de)ciphered with a different key, K = K<sub>1</sub> K<sub>2</sub></li> <li>e.g. C = K(P) = K<sub>1</sub> (P<sub>1</sub>) K<sub>2</sub> (P<sub>2</sub>)</li> </ul>	RC4, One-time pad
	block	(pure)	<ul> <li>each piece is (de)ciphered with the same key, <i>K</i></li> <li>e.g. C = K(P) = K(P<sub>1</sub>) K(P<sub>2</sub>)</li> <li>fingerprinting does not use keys</li> <li>in general, F = H(P) = H(P<sub>1</sub>) H(P<sub>2</sub>)</li> </ul>	AES, RSA <sup>1</sup> (both) in ECB <sup>2</sup> mode; SHA-2, SHA-3 <sup>3</sup>
		mixed	• each piece is (de)ciphered with a "virtual" different key, combination of the same key with additional (and different) information per block	AES in CBC <sup>4</sup> mode

<sup>1</sup> Many authors do not consider RSA to be a block cipher, as it is not efficient enough to be used consecutively (block after block) in long documents. E.g., see section 3.5 of Peter Gutmann, <u>Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software</u>.

<sup>2</sup> Electronic Code Book

<sup>3</sup> SHA: Secure Hash Algorithms

<sup>4</sup> Cipher Block Chaining

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems

## On the purpose

Perspective	Variant	Sub-variant	Comments	Exs
on the purpose	bidirectional, reversible, two-way	symmetric	<ul> <li>usage: mostly, confidentiality<sup>1</sup></li> <li>(see picture C below)</li> </ul>	AES
		asymmetric	<ul> <li>usage: mostly, authentication<sup>2</sup>; also confidentiality<sup>3</sup></li> <li>(see picture A1 below)</li> </ul>	RSA
	unidirectional, irreversible, one-way		<ul><li>usage: authentication, integrity</li><li>(see pictures A2, I below)</li></ul>	SHA-2, SHA-3
	mixed		<ul><li>usage: mostly, both confidentiality &amp; integrity</li><li>(see picture CI below)</li></ul>	AES-CBC- HMAC-SHA1

<sup>1</sup> with temporary keys

with personal and durable (long-lasting) keys

<sup>3</sup> of small amounts of data, e.g. symmetric keys

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose...




Fig C. Confidentiality with symmetric cryptography.




Fig A1. Authentication with asymmetric cryptography.

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose...




Fig A2. Authentication with cryptographic hashing.




Fig I. Integrity with cryptographic hashing.

### ...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose




Fig CI. Confidentiality & Integrity (Authenticated Encipherment).

# **Cryptographic Keys**

#### **Definition**

- <u>cryptographic key</u> piece of data needed for cryptographic operations
  - o usually: number or string hard to memorize
  - o some times: fit to a mathematical procedure (algorithm)<sup>1</sup>
  - most of the times: secret

## Key types of cryptographic keys

Designation "Owner" entity		Main application	Cryptographic type	Longevity	Efficiency
personal	human	authentication	public-key	extended	low
session	communication channel	confidentiality	shared-key	short <sup>2</sup>	high <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> so, user cannot "choose" it: a "cryptographic key generator" is needed

<sup>2</sup> to be use-resistant (prevent brute-force search and repetition attacks)

<sup>3</sup> so, can accommodate heavy traffic

## **Key Management**

- generation
  - o problem solved: just take care with choosing of seed values<sup>1</sup>
- storage
  - many "solutions", but still a problem swept under the rug!
- distribution
  - big problem:
    - physically separated entities must exchange/agree on cryptographic keys
  - solutions:
    - several, depending on type of cryptography (symmetric or asymmetric)
    - specific of asymmetric:
      - *public key* is distributed mostly by <u>digital certificates</u>

l here, randomness is essential

### ...Key Management: Digital Certificate...

### Digital certificate

- document that maps an entity to a cryptographic public key
  - the mapping is guaranteed by T, by digital signing the document<sup>2</sup>

trusts trusts В Dig. Cert. Dig. Cert.  $A \leftrightarrow K$  $B \leftrightarrow k$ Fig. Representation of users, trusted certificate emitter and digital certificate's essential content. Sig: Sig:

T is entity trusted by A and B: 1- they believe T operates in an honest way; 2- they have previously exchanged cryptographic info with T. Usually, but not necessarily, T is connoted with a Certification Authority (CA).

so, assuring the legitimacy of the certificate's content; technique will be discussed later

### ...Key Management: Digital Certificate

### Typical content

I hereby certify that the public key

19836A8B03030CF83737E3837837FC3s87092827262643FFA82710382828282A

belongs to

Robert John Smith

12345 University Avenue

Berkeley, CA 94702

Birthday: July 4, 1958

Email: bob@superdupernet.com

SHA-1 hash of the above certificate signed with the CA's private key

Fig. *Really* relevant content type of a digital certificate (*in* several of Tanenbaum's books).

- identity of key's owner
- his/her public key
- <u>identity of emitter</u><sup>1</sup>
- <u>digital signature of emitter</u>

- expiration date of certificate
- serial number
- specific purpose
- etc.

<sup>1</sup> e.g. tipically, a Certificate Authority

## Randomness

- essential in Cryptography!
  - one time pad, IV (initialization values), stream cipher seeds
  - hashes
  - nonces, key generation (e.g. asymmetric keys)...
- generation
  - excellent: physical source
    - inherent: radioactive decay, Brownian movement, ...
    - depending on initial conditions: (non-biased) roulette, dice, ...
  - o reasonable: algorithmic-based with physical seed
    - cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators
      - use physical (hopefully random) sources (e.g. mouse movements)
      - Linux's getrandom() (/dev/random, /dev/urandom)
  - o bad: algorithmic-based
    - pseudorandom number generators
      - POSIX's random()

# **Cryptographic libraries**

- essential in cryptographic programming
  - encryption, hashing, signing... different algorithms... all ready to be used
    - coupled with a "cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator"
  - why not write your own library?
    - Highly dangerous! It is not just implementing algorithms, it is how they are used, how "random" numbers are generated and chosen, etc.¹
- examples
  - OpenSSL: the reference!<sup>2</sup>
    - components: application & C library
    - EVP (envelope) "high level" API (lab classes)
  - WebCrypto: JavaScript (by W3C)
  - o Bouncy Castle: Java and C# (by Australia's Legion...)
  - Libgcrypt: C (OpenPGP library) (by GnuPG community)
  - PyCryptodome: Phyton
- 1 see, for instance, https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18197/why-shouldnt-we-roll-our-own
- 2 in spite of same infamous bugs, such as *The Heartbleed Bug* (<u>heartbleed.com</u>)

# **Cryptographic algorithms**

- <u>RC4</u>: stream key generation (1987, survives with medication)
- <u>DES</u><sup>1</sup>: reversible system, secret key (1975, defunct)
- <u>AES</u>: reversible system, secret key (1998, still healthy)
- RSA<sup>2</sup>: reversible system, public key (1977, still healthy)
- MD5<sup>3</sup>: irreversible system (1992, defunct)
- SHA-1<sup>4</sup>: irreversible system (1995, defunct)
- SHA-2: irreversible system (2001, still healthy)
- SHA-3<sup>5</sup>: irreversible system (2015, yet in phase of wide adoption)

- 1 Data Encryption Standard, a landmark of cryptography
- 2 another landmark of (public-key) cryptography
- 3 yet another landmark of cryptography
- 4 about SHA-1 end of life, see sha-mbles.github.io
- 5 based on new paradigm sponge construction (keccak.team/sponge\_duplex.html)

# **Cryptographic transformations**

- diverse, generally follow some major "patterns" for each type of cryptography
- in general, Shannon's recommended properties<sup>1</sup> are followed:
  - o diffusion each plaintext unit (e.g. char) affects many transformed units
  - confusion transformed output depends complexly on key (if it exists)

## Common patterns<sup>2</sup> - symmetric cryptography

- <u>Transposition</u> exchange (swapping) of positions of elements P-box
- <u>Substitution</u> exchange of elements (e.g. Caesar's cipher) *S-box*
- <u>Combination</u> transposition and substitution cascade *product cipher* [Fig.C]
- Feistel construct (e.g. 3DES) [Fig.F]
- ...

<sup>1</sup> Those were thought to symmetric cryptography, the only that existed at the time (1949); however, they are applied, at least partially, to other, contemporary cryptographic systems.

<sup>2</sup> or transformations

### ...Cryptographic transformations: common patterns...




Fig C. Symmetric transformations: a) permutation box; b) substitution box; c) "complete", product cipher. Exercise: find out the algorithms for P- and S- boxes and validate them with c).





Fig F. Feistel symmetric construct "in action". *F* is Feistel (or *round*) function.

### ...Cryptographic transformations: common patterns...

### Common patterns - asymmetric constructs

- based on apparent intractability of computational problems:
  - easy to compute with knowledge of some data;
     otherwise, most difficult (intractable) to compute<sup>1</sup>
  - common computational problems:
    - integer factorization (e.g. RSA)
    - discrete logarithm problem (e.g. DSA)
    - **...**



## Common patterns - "hash" cryptography

- most common are iterated hash functions
  - Merkle-Damgård construct (e.g. SHA-2)
  - sponge construct (e.g. SHA-3)
  - 0 ...

Informally, an easy or tractable problem can be solved in less than  $n^k$  (polynomial) time units, k being an integer and n the size of the problem (e.g. number of items to sort); a hard or intractable problem will need  $k^n$  (exponential) time units to be solved.

## Some numbers...

- $\bullet$  2<sup>8</sup> = 256
- $\bullet$  2<sup>32</sup> = 4 294 967 296

number of values represented by a byte

maximum number of IPv4 addresses

 $\simeq$  0,5 \* number of people on Earth in 2023

- $2^{56} = 72\,057\,594\,037\,927\,936$  number of different keys for DES algorithm
- 2<sup>64</sup> = 18 446 744 073 709 551 616 1+ number of grains of wheat in chess board (from 1, doubled in each square)
- $2^{76} \simeq 10^{23}$  mass of the Moon in kg
- $2^{79} \simeq 10^{24}$  Avogadro's constant
- $2^{82} \simeq 10^{25}$  mass of the Earth in kg
- $2^{101} \simeq 10^{30}$  mass of the Sun in kg
- $2^{128}$ = 340 282 366 920 938 463 463 374 607 431 768 211 456  $\simeq 10^{38}$  maximum number of IPv6 addresses
- $2^{256} \simeq 10^{77}$  number of values of SHA-256 hash
- $2^{280} \simeq 10^{84}$  number of fundamental particles in the observable universe

## Pointers...

- The "**Public-key cryptography paper**", 1976 W. Diffie, M. E. Hellman
  - o <u>www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/24.pdf</u>
- The "**RSA paper**", 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman
  - o <u>dx.doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342</u>
- The "ElGamal Signature Scheme", 1985 Taher Elgamal
  - <u>ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01057074</u>
- The "**DES Cryptanalysis paper**", 1977 W. Diffie, M. E. Hellman
  - o www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/27.pdf
- The "**Rijndael, AES Proposal**", 1999 Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen
  - o <u>citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.36.640</u>
- The "MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", 1992 R. Rivest
  - tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1321
- The "**The Keccak SHA-3 submission**", 2011 G. Bertoni et al.
  - o <u>keccak.team/files/Keccak-submission-3.pdf</u>
- The "Crypto Mini-FAQ", Internet FAQ Archives, -2014 Roger Schlafly
  - www.faqs.org/faqs/crypto/faq/